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Using a sample of households in 48 Chinese villages for the period 1986-2002, this paper studies the
dynamic effects of major health shocks on household income and the role played by village elections
in mitigating these effects. Our results show that in the first 15 years after a shock, a shock-hit household
on average falls short of its normal income trajectory by 11.8% and its recovery would take 19 years.
Based on the premise that shock-hit families impose negative externalities on richer families by borrowing
from them, our political economy model predicts that the outcome of village elections would differ
from that of a standard median voter model in that the elected village leaders tend to adopt pro-poor
policies. Our empirical study finds that villages are more likely to establish a healthcare plan after
the election is introduced. In addition, village elections reduce the probability of a household to borrow
by 16.7% when one of its working adults is seriously sick. As a result, they reduce more than half
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HEALTH SHOCKS, VILLAGE ELECTIONS, AND LONG-TERM INCOME: 
EVIDENCE FROM RURAL CHINA 
 
 
Abstract: Using a sample of households in 48 Chinese villages for the period 
1986-2002, this paper studies the dynamic effects of major health shocks on 
household income and the role played by village elections in mitigating these effects. 
Our results show that in the first 15 years after a shock, a shock-hit household on 
average falls short of its normal income trajectory by 11.8% and its recovery would 
take 19 years. Based on the premise that shock-hit families impose negative 
externalities on richer families by borrowing from them, our political economy model 
predicts that the outcome of village elections would differ from that of a standard 
median voter model in that the elected village leaders tend to adopt pro-poor policies. 
Our empirical study finds that villages are more likely to establish a healthcare plan 
after the election is introduced. In addition, village elections reduce the probability of 
a household to borrow by 16.7% when one of its working adults is seriously sick. As a 
result, they reduce more than half of the negative effect of a health shock on 
household income.   
 
 JEL classification: I12, O15, Z13 
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HEALTH SHOCKS, VILLAGE ELECTIONS, AND LONG-TERM INCOME: 
EVIDENCE FROM RURAL CHINA 
 
Major health shocks have a direct effect and an indirect effect for uninsured or 
partially insured farm households in terms of their long-term income. The direct effect 
is that the family loses income for a period of time if the sick person is a major laborer 
in the family. The indirect effect is related to the treatment of the illness. The family 
has to spend a large amount of money in a short period of time, which often leads to 
heavy indebtedness. This forces the family to slow down its pace of asset 
accumulation including children’s education. As a result, this family loses or partially 
loses its capability to generate income in the long run. Adding together, these two 
effects may cause a household struck by a major health shock to fall into persistent 
poverty.  
Despite the possible dire effects of health shocks, systematic studies have been 
sparse to determine the extent and duration of the above negative impacts, primarily 
because of the lack of properly designed longitudinal data (Foster, 1995; Strauss and 
Thomas, 1998). Using a unique longitudinal dataset of 17 years from rural China, the 
first goal of this paper is to provide an assessment of the impacts of major health 
shocks on farmers’ long-term income. Our strategy is to first build up a heuristic 
dynamic model and obtain a testable hypothesis regarding the negative impacts of 
health shocks, and then to test the hypothesis using our dataset. The distinct feature of 
the hypothesis is that a family’s income trajectory after a health shock follows a   4
U-shaped path over time relative to its income trajectory on the balanced growth path. 
This is so because a shock-hit family’s physical and health capital accumulation is 
crowded out by the treatment of the illness in the first several years after a shock, but 
then gradually picks up in later years. 
During our sample period (1986-2002), an important institutional change 
occurred in China. Democratic elections at village level were first experimented in the 
mid-1980s and later in 1998 a formal law --- The Organic Law for the Village 
Committee (OLVC) --- was enacted that requires all villages to hold elections. Despite 
many controversies and political fights, elections have spread to every corner of the 
country and taken roots in the grassroots society (O’Brien and Li, 2000). Local 
elections have been found to increase the accountability of the local government in 
recent literature. Zhang, Fan, Zhang, and Huang (2004) and Wang and Yao (2006) 
find that elections have shifted government spending from items benefiting the village 
leaders to those benefiting the general public in Chinese villages. While these findings 
are largely consistent with predictions of the standard median voter model, there are 
findings showing that the outcomes of village elections could depart from the 
predictions of the model under the assumption of a symmetric population. For 
instance, Shen and Yao (2006) find that elections have brought about more equal 
income distribution in Chinese villages. Foster and Rosenzweig (2001) find that 
village elections in India lead local governments to spend more on road building 
instead of on irrigation facilities. Road building provides jobs to the landless, who are   5
only minority in rural Indian,
1  so elections lead to a pro-poor policy. Chattopadhyay 
and Duflo (2004) find that elected female village heads in India tend to adopt more 
women-friendly policies, which implies that personal preferences of the elected 
officials can lead to outcomes that deviate from the predictions of the median voter 
model. 
In this paper, we propose and test another channel for the outcomes of local 
elections to deviate from the median voter model based on the premise that health 
shocks not only hurt the families receiving them, but also bring negative externalities 
to other families. We set our stage in the case of establishing self-financed healthcare 
plans in a village. The tradeoff for a family is between the amount of income it could 
recover from the plan and the premium it has to pay. To the extent that health shocks 
bring a smaller loss to richer families than to poorer families, richer families subsidize 
poorer families in a healthcare plan. When health shocks do not bring negative 
externalities, the elected village leader does not have an incentive to establish a 
healthcare plan in a village with a symmetric distribution of income (or wealth) 
because the median voter has a net gain of zero and thus is indifferent with such a 
plan. However, when health shocks bring negative externalities, the outcome may 
change. The key is that after receiving a major health shock, poorer families have to 
rely on private social networks to deal with the shock. They would most likely to 
borrow from richer relatives or friends who are bound by social ties not to reject. This 
then imposes a negative externality on richer villagers. The median voter then has a 
                                                        
1  Landless households in rural India are about 11% of the total number of rural households. See Srivastava, 
Saxena, and Thorat (forthcoming).   6
positive net gain from a healthcare plan that fully insures against the income loss 
brought by a major illness because the plan not only compensates for his direct 
expected loss due to the illness, but also eliminates the expected loss imposed by 
farmers poorer than he is. Therefore, villages with elections are more likely to 
establish a healthcare plan. As a result, families in villages with elections are in a 
better position to deal with health shocks, so their long-term income should be higher. 
The second goal of this paper then is to study if village elections lead to a better 
chance for a village to establish a healthcare plan, to reduce shock-hit families’ needs 
to borrow from informal sources, and ultimately to mitigate the negative impacts of 
health shocks on farms’ long-term income. 
Our data come from two major sources. One is the National Fixed-point Survey 
(NFS) maintained by the Research Center of Rural Economy, the Ministry of 
Agriculture, the People’s Republic of China. It provides background village 
information for the period 1986-2002 and household information for the period 
1987-2002. The second data source is a retrospective survey conducted by the authors 
in the spring of 2003 to obtain information on the household history of major illnesses 
and village governance in the period of 1986-2002. The assembled dataset enables us 
to study the dynamic impacts of major health shocks on households’ long-term 
income trajectories and elections’ role in mitigating these impacts.   
We show that a household with a major health shock on average falls short of its 
normal income trajectory by 11.6% within 15 years after the shock. The peak of the 
negative impact happens in the 8
th year after the shock when the income shortfall   7
reaches 28.4%. Extrapolating our estimates beyond the 15
th year, the longest duration 
that our data allow us to study, we find that it would take 19 years for a shock-hit 
household to fully recover to its normal income trajectory.   
Village elections are found to play a significant role in mitigating the negative 
impacts of major health shocks. Having elections raises a village’s probability to have 
a healthcare plan by 11.6% and reduces the probability of a household to borrow by 
9.9% when one of its working adults is seriously sick. On average, elections move a 
shock-hit household closer to its normal income trajectory by about half of the 
average negative effect of a shock.   
One potential problem for our results is the selection biases in illness reporting. 
Since we had to resort to a somewhat arbitrary definition of a major health shock --- it 
is qualified as a major health shock if a treatment required an expenditure of more 
than 5,000 RMB (about 633 dollars) or hospitalization, it is likely that the reports of 
the shocks were correlated with income and other family characteristics. It is ideal to 
handle this problem by using individual or household level instruments for the shock, 
but such instruments are hard to find. Instead, we follow the literature (e.g., Strauss 
and Thomas, 1998) by using two community-level variables, the number of hospitals 
in the township/xiang and the number of hospitals in the county, as the instruments for 
the shocks. Our two-stage panel estimation qualitatively confirms our earlier results. 
Another potential problem is the endogeneity of the introduction of village 
elections. Although the province was the key in spreading village elections, variations 
within a province existed. The characteristics of the residents could play a role in   8
determining whether a village started elections. We instrument the introduction of 
village elections by the timing of a province’s adoption of the OLVC and two 
village-level variables reflecting the distribution of lineages. The new results are 
consistent with our earlier results except in the case of village healthcare plans. 
The rest of the paper is arranged as the follows. Section 1 first presents a simple 
dynamic model for the U-shaped impacts of a health shock on farmers’ long-term 
income, and then constructs a simple political economy model to show how the 
negative externalities of health shocks could lead to the establishment of a healthcare 
plan. Section 2 introduces the data and discusses some measurement issues. Section 3 
tests our hypotheses regarding the negative impacts of health shocks on household 
income. Section 4 studies the role of village elections in mitigating the negative 
impacts of health shocks. Section 5 concludes. 
 
1.  The Theoretical Model 
 
There are several ways to model a health shock. One way is to assume that the 
probability that an individual experiences a health shock depends on previous health 
expenditures. Here we adopt a simpler way of modeling the health shock by assuming 
that the probability of a health shock does not depend on previous decisions of the 
individual. As a consequence of this assumption, the household behaves before the 
health shock arrives as if the shock would never arrive. This assumption is common in 
the literature on natural shocks (e.g., Jacoby and Skoufias, 1996). A potentially 
important problem, however, is that it assumes away households’ preventative   9
measures against health shocks. To remedy this problem, we will make the size of the 
shock endogenously determined by the stock of health when a shock arrives. Since 
our concern is the impacts of large health shocks, modeling the size of the shock is a 
reasonable approach. 
 
1.1 The balanced growth path of a shock-free farmer 
We first develop the benchmark case in which a household never receives a health 
shock in its lifetime. To simplify the exposure, we model an individual farmer instead 
of a household. The representative farmer starts with an initial stock of physical assets 
K0 and an initial stock of health H0. Here physical assets include productive 
equipment and bank deposits while health can be thought as the level of effective 
labor supply. The farmer’s production technology exhibits constant return to scale in 
physical assets and health stock, and the production function is yt =
α α − 1
t t H AK , α∈(0, 
1), where Kt and Ht are his stocks of assets and health at the beginning of year t, and A 
is an efficiency index that can be influenced by both the farmer’s own ability and the 
village’s public supports. The farmer’s consumption in period t is ct, and his utility 
derived from consumption is ln(ct). In each period, the farmer decides his levels of 
consumption ct, investment in assets It, and investment in health et. Asset and health 
stocks evolve as follows: 
(1)  t t t t K I K K δ − + = +1 , and 
(2)  t t t t H he H H σ − + = +1 . 
In (1), the assets follow the usual evolvement with a depreciation rate of δ. Following   10
Grossman’s seminal papers (Grossman, 1972, 1973) on health stock, we let the health 
stock have the same motion of evolvement: during each period, health stock Ht 
depreciates at the rate of σ. An investment (health expenditure) of et would raise the 
health stock by h·et, where h is the conversion factor between the health stock and 
health investment.   
A salient feature of low-income economies is that farm households are credit 
constrained. Here we assume the extreme case in which the representative farmer has 
to rely on its current income to finance his consumption and investments in both 
physical assets and health. With the above setup, the representative farmer’s problem 
in any year t is 
(3)     ) , ( ln    1 1 1
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where ρ is the discount factor, and Vt+1 is the farmer’s value function starting in period 
t + 1. Abstract from its contents, this is a standard Ramsey-type growth model and has 
a unique balanced growth path (BGP). Appendix I shows the details of the solution 
process. Assuming that assets and health have the same depreciation rate, that is, 
δ σ = đthen we have on the BGP 
(4)  )] 1 ( ) 1 [(
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A corollary of equation (5) is that given the same production technology of constant   11
return to scale, all the farmers have the same marginal product of assets at the BGP 
regardless of the levels of their stocks of assets and health. It also follows from the 

















y 1 1 1 1 + + + + = = = . 
That is, income, assets, and health grow at the same constant rate that the 
consumption is growing with. It is noteworthy that this rate increases in A. To the 
extent that they increase A, village public supports increase farmers’ income, asset, 
and health growth rate at the BGP. Holding the initial levels constant, this means that 
village public supports also bring farmers to a BGP with higher levels of income and 
stocks of assets and health. 
 
1.2 Health shocks and the borrower 
We assume that the representative farmer has already been on the BGP when the 
health shock arrives. We also make the assumption that the shock always arrives at the 
beginning of a year and the farmer will only receive one shock in his lifetime. The 
severity of the shock negatively depends on the farmer’s stock of health when the 
shock arrives. So, assuming that he receives the shock in year τ, his health stock after 
the shock becomes 
(7)  ) (
~
τ τ τ H L H H − = , 
where L(.) is an decreasing function of Hτ and is between 0 and Hτ for any τ. We 
assume that the treatment of the health shock happens immediately after the shock, so 
does the expenditures. With the treatment, the farmer’s health does not deteriorate to   12
fall below τ H
~ . The expenditure E to cure the illness increases in L(Hτ) so we express 
it as a decreasing function of Hτ, E(Hτ). The farmer has to sell his assets to pay for E.
2 
Let the amount of his sales be KE, so the stock of assets left with him is   
(8)  E K K K − = τ τ
~
. 
KE may not be enough to pay for E in which case the farmer borrows   
(9)  E K H E B − = ) ( τ  
from relatives or friends within the village. If B is positive, we call the farmer a 
borrower. It is worth keeping in mind that B changes as τ changes. The annual interest 
rate is exogenously given as r. Since farmers are credit constrained, r is smaller than 
the marginal product of assets on the BGP for everyone. The term of the debt is fixed 
to T years. Assuming that he starts to repay the debt in period τ with equal payment 
for each year, the borrower needs to repay b = (0.5 + 1/T)r + B/T in each period.   
At the beginning of year τ, therefore, a shock-hit farmer needs to determine the 
amount of assets to cash in and the paths for subsequent asset and health accumulation. 
Conditional on the first decision’s having been made, the second set of decisions can 
be expressed as 
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2  We have defined assets as productive equipment and bank deposits, and deliberately excluded durable 
consumption goods such as houses because the secondary markets for these goods are very thin in rural China.   13
Denote the value function of the problem in (10) by Vτ(B,  τ K
~
,  τ H
~
).  τ H
~
 is 
predetermined by the shock and Hτ, so we only need to study the farmer’s decision on 
the size of the borrowing, the other decision that we laid out for him at the beginning 
of year τ. This is equivalent to determining τ K
~
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Appendix II establishes the following intuitive and useful result: 
  Result 1. A farmer who has a larger stock of physical assets at the time when a 
health shock occurs tends to borrow less. 
The BGP of the problem in (10) is the same as that in (3). But we are more 
interested in its transition dynamics. Analytical results are impossible, though; so we 
rely on numerical simulations to assess the transition dynamics. Figure 1 presents the 
results of one set of the simulations. Chart A compares the income trajectory after the 
shock and the one on the BGP, and Chart B shows the gap between the two 
trajectories. The shock is assumed to be large, knocking down income by about 30% 
in the first year. The gap then follows a U curve with the trough happening in the 11
th 
year after the shock happens. The figure ends at the 27
th year after the shock and 
shows that the gap is still large at that point. The intuition behind the U curve is 
relatively straightforward. A shock-hit farmer loses his health and needs to cash in his 
physical assets to pay for his treatment, so his income immediately declines. The 
decline may continue even after he finishes repaying his debts (in Figure 1, the   14
repayment period is set to 5 years) because he can not invest much at the low level of 
income so his stock of assets declines because of depreciation. It is only after his 
stocks of both health and assets begin to increase again will his income increase. So 
we have the following testable hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1. The income of a shock-hit farmer falls below his BGP level and 
follows a U-shaped trajectory relative to his BGP.    
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
1.3 Health shocks and the lender 
When a farmer who has experienced a health shock approaches a lender, the lender 
is often obligated to lend by the social norms in small-village settings. Since a health 
shock cannot be anticipated by either the borrower or the lender, the lender’s asset and 
health accumulation path is likely to be changed. The loan is not the same as an 
ordinary loan. It is an unexpected event, and the lender has to sell off his assets to 
make the loan. As a result, the loan is likely to reduce the lender’s overall welfare.   
Assume that the lender is on the BGP when he is approached by a shock-hit farmer 
in year τ and it is already optimal for the lender not to lend.
3  Because of social 
obligations, he has to make a loan of the amount B to the borrower. Then he gets back 
b in each period for T periods. The following arguments establish that the lender loses 
with the lending. First, the lending forces the lender to operate with a stock of assets 
that is below its BGP level. Second, the lending is equivalent to the case in which the 
                                                        
3  This second assumption is not essential, though. Even if the lender does lend on the BGP, the loan to the 
borrower is still an unexpected event and reduces the lender’s asset stock to the level below its optimum.   15
lender rents out assets in the amount of B, B – b, B – 2b, …, b in the years between τ 
and τ + T – 1, respectively, that all bring a constant rate of return of r. Third, the 
marginal product of assets in each period is larger than that on the BGP because the 
stock of assets is smaller. Since r is less than the marginal product of assets on the 
BGP, it is better for the lender to use the assets lent out in his own production. 
 
1.4 The role of village elections 
Before village elections were introduced, the village government in rural China 
was appointed by the township government so its main mandate was to meet the 
demands of the upper-level governments. With village elections, the village 
government has to care about the demands of the majority of the villagers if it wants 
to be reelected. The most convenient model to study the outcome of a democracy is 
the median voter model, which we adopt here. In the case of no externalities, the 
median voter is indifferent with a pro-poor policy, so such a policy is not guaranteed 
by voting. In our case, a shock-hit farmer borrows from richer farmers and imposes 
negative externalities on them. Since the incidence of health shocks is random, almost 
everyone in the village would have a chance to receive the negative externalities. The 
village government can then establish an insurance scheme with a reasonable 
coverage (to be exactly defined shortly) and wins the support of the median voter. 
To begin with our formal modeling, it is natural to set the political stage on the 
BGP. Result 1 establishes that the amount of borrowing of a shock-hit farmer depends 
on his stock of physical assets at the time when a shock arrives. So we will work with   16
the distribution of the stock of assets on the BGP.
4  Assume that in any period τ the 
stock of physical assets is distributed symmetrically in the interval  ] , [ K K with the 
mean and median being KE (the subscription τ is suppressed). Let φ(K) and Φ(K) 
denote the density and accumulative function of the distribution, respectively. Let p be 
the probability that a particular farmer is hit by a health shock. For any farmer with a 
stock of assets K, his direct expected loss due to a health shock, denoted by CB(K), is 
the discounted sum of the his income losses: 
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being defined in (8) and (7), respectively. 
It is evident that CB(K) is positive by Hypothesis 1. In addition, it decreases in K 
because of Result 1 and the diminishing marginal product of assets.   
In addition to the direct loss, a farmer also incurs a loss from the negative 
externalities that the shock-hit farmers imposed on him. To be consistent with our 
initial idea, we assume that a shock-hit farmer with a stock of assets x borrows from 
one of the farmers who have a stock of assets larger than x. So the density function for 
a farmer with a stock of capital K > x to be forced to lend is )] ( 1 /[ ) ( x K Φ − φ . Let L(x, 
K) denote farmer K’s discounted value of loss caused by the borrowing of farmer x (to 
abuse a bit notions, we use the stock of assets to denote farmers). It is value is 
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4  The other state variable, the stock of health, is proportional to the stock of physical anyway.   17
where B(x) is farmer x’s borrowing. By the results of the last two sub-sections, L(x; K) 
is positive and decreases in both x and K. The expected loss of farmer K, which we 
denote by CL(K), is the sum of the costs imposed by all the farmers who have a stock 
of assets less than his: 
(14)  ∫ Φ −
=
K
K L dx K x L
x
K






The relationship between CL(K) and K is complicated. In Figure 2 we show one 
plausible scenario in which CL(K) first increases in K and then turns flat afterwards.
5 
The shape of CL(K) is not important for our discussion, though. What is important is 
that CL(K) is positive for everyone. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
To discuss how the negative externalities would change villagers’ voting behavior, 
we consider a simple case in which CB(K) is linear in K, as shown in Figure 2. Then 
let us think about an insurance scheme that aims at insuring against the direct cost of 
health shocks.
6  It is straightforward to show that charging a risk premium that is 
equal to CB(Km), the direct loss of the median voter, suffices to provide full insurance 
for all because the surplus of the richer portion of the population (the shaded triangle 
                                                        
5  The intuition is the following. First of all, a farmer will be asked by more people to lend when his stock of assets 
is larger, so his total loss increases with his stock of assets. On the other hand, however, the loss brought about by 
one lending diminishes when a farmer is better endowed with assets. In addition, to the extent that the density of 
farmers decreases with the stock of assets, a farmer’s chances to be approached by one shock-hit farmer diminish 
as his stock of assets increases. 
6  This scheme is different from most of the insurance schemes in practice, which insure against the cost of 
treatment. We work with the income loss for the purpose to simplify our analysis. It is noteworthy that insuring 
against income losses is more demanding than insuring against the treatment cost, so our results are robust.   18
on the right) just compensates the deficit of the poorer portion of the population (the 
shaded triangle on the left). However, in the case without negative externalities, this 
insurance scheme will not be approved by the constituency because the median voter 
is indifferent with it. In the case with negative externalities, the scheme will win the 
support of median voter because it eliminates his burden of the indirect cost imposed 
by the borrowings of farmers that are poorer than he is. This establishes our second 
testable hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2. A village with elections is more likely to establish a healthcare plan 
than a village without. 
Based on this hypothesis and our earlier results, we have two more testable 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3. A shock-hit person living in a village with elections borrows less 
than another living in a village without elections. 
Hypothesis 4. Election reduces the negative impacts of a health shock on income. 
 
Hypothesis 3 directly follows Hypothesis 2 because a healthcare plan substitutes for 
own spending. Hypothesis 4 follows Hypothesis 3. Elections reduce a shock-hit 
farmer’s borrowings so his accumulation of assets is less affected by the shock, and 
his income can recover quicker to his BGP level.   
 
2.  Data and Measurements 
 
2.1 Data   19
As mentioned in Section 1, two major data sources are used in this analysis. One 
is the National Fixed-Point Survey (NFS), and the other is a retrospective survey 
conducted by the authors in 2003. The NFS started in 1986 and is a longitudinal 
survey of about 34,000 households in all continental Chinese provinces. It used a 
stratified random sampling strategy to draw its sample when it was first started. 
Despite attritions, it has generally maintained a panel structure although 
mis-numbering of households exists. Because of the budget constraint of our research 
fund, the retrospective survey was only conducted in a sub-sample of the full NFS 
sample. In particular, we randomly select 48 villages in 8 provinces to conduct the 
retrospective survey. The eight provinces are Guangdong, Zhejiang, Hunan, Henan, 
Shanxi, Jilin, Sichuan, and Gansu. They are representative of the various regions in 
China. 
To ensure a panel structure for the data, we used several combined criteria based 
on household characteristics (the size of the house, landholding, number of people, 
and the age of the head) to identify and match households. Consequently, in the eight 
provinces covered by our survey, 1,354 households remained in the sample. The 
exclusion is likely to be random as no systematic attrition and change of households 
were reported in the NFS. As a result, our samples can be treated as a stratified 
random sample. The NFS has already provided information on village and household 
economic and social characteristics, so our supplemental survey only asked questions 
related to individual health history and village governance. The household data 
provided by the NFS cover the period 1987 to 2002, but do not have information for   20
1990, 1992, and 1994 when no surveys were conducted because of budgetary 
problems. The village data provided by the NFS cover one more year of 1986. We 
input the missing village data of the three years by the average of the nearby two 
years but leave the household data intact.   
The 2003 retrospective survey asked three sets of information. The first set is 
concerned with the family history of major illnesses since 1986. Key questions were 
asked for information on when an illness happened, how serious it was, personal data 
of the patient, and whether loans were taken for its treatment. The second set is about 
village elections since 1986. Key questions were asked about the frequency of the 
election and the nomination procedure and composition of the elected village 
committee in each election. The third set is about the healthcare services and facilities 
in the villages since 1986 including information on healthcare plans, clinics, and 
village subsidies to health services and facilities. Later, a phone interview also 
retrieved information on village lineages and the numbers of hospitals in the township 
and the county. 
In summary, we have complete household-level data for 13 years (1987-2002, 
with data of 1990, 1992, and 1994 missing) and complete village-level data for 17 
years (1986-2002). This long panel of data allows us to estimate the impact of health 
shocks and the role of elections in mitigating it. 
Figure 3 presents the trend of income growth in the sample. Income growth was 
substantial over the period of 1987-2002. The average per-capita income in 2002 was   21
2.2 times of that in 1987,
7  which implies an average annual growth rate of 5.4%.   
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
2.2 Measurement issues 
In our supplemental survey, we define a major health shock as an illness that 
requires hospitalization or a total spending over 5,000 RMB for practical reasons. The 
period covered by our survey is very long, so we had to restrict our attention to major 
health shocks so as to ensure the accuracy of people’s recounting of their families’ 
health history. However, this definition causes a truncation on the incidence of illness. 
Some households may have experienced a major health shock but nevertheless neither 
spent more than 5,000 RMB nor sent the patient to hospital because they did not have 
enough money. This truncation thus may systematically exclude poor families who 
experienced major health shocks.   
To find out if our definition of health shocks causes under-reporting from poorer 
households, we compare in Figure 4 two income series, one is the average annual 
income of the households who reported no health shocks in the survey period, and the 
other is the average annual income of those who reported at least one health shock. In 
the figure and our subsequent analysis, a household is classified as being hit by a 
health shock if one of his members was hit by a major health shock.
8  The two income 
                                                        
7  The average income in our sample was higher than the national average of 2,476 RMB in 2002. NFS relies on 
household bookkeeping to collect data, so it oversamples larger and better-educated households when it first 
started in 1986 because these households were more able to maintain good bookkeeping. 
8  Some households were hit twice in the survey period. Those households start to be classified as being hit by a   22
series followed almost identical trajectories. Averaging over the entire period of 
1987-2002, the shock-hit households had a slightly lower per-capita income than the 
shock-free households (-10.64 RMB on average), but the gap was highly insignificant 
on statistical measures. Therefore, report biases based on cross-sectional income gaps 
are not likely to be a serious problem in the data. 
[Figure 4 about here] 
However, Figure 5 shows that there is a significant up-trend in illness reports over 
time. The incidence of shocks increased from the range of 2% to 5% in the early years 
to the range of around 10% in 2001 and 2002. One explanation for this large increase 
is income growth over the time period. However, other explanations are also possible. 
For example, memory loss may cause a smaller number of reports for the earlier years. 
In addition, the people in our sample became significantly older in our sample period; 
their average age increased from 26.3 years old in 1987 to 37.7 years old in 2002. So 
the incidence of illness naturally rose over the years. It is thus possible that the trend 
displayed in Figure 4 reflects a real phenomenon rather than report biases.   
[Figure 5 about here] 
It is noteworthy, though, that the existence of truncation will only reinforce our 
results if we find that health shocks reduce a household’s long-term income because 
truncation selects more high-income households into the group of shock-hit 
households. Therefore, the estimate of our upcoming econometric exercise can serve 
as the lower bound for the negative effect of health shocks. Nevertheless, two 
                                                                                                                                                               
health shock since the year when its first shock happened.   23
alternative specifications, one using a sub-sample of the early years when illness 
reports are more homogenous, and one using instruments for the incidence of health 
shocks, are estimated to check the robustness of our results. 
 
3.  Negative Impacts of Health Shocks 
 
3.1 Econometric models and variables 
To study the negative effects of health shocks on income, we first estimate the 
following baseline panel model with household and year fixed effects: 
(15)   it t i it s it it e S X y + + + + = α α α β ln , 
where yit is the per-capita income (in 2002 RMB) of household i in year t, Xit is a set 
of control variables; Sit is a dummy variable indicating whether a household is hit by a 
health shock, that is, it takes value 1 since a household is hit and takes value 0 before 
it is hit; αi is the household fixed effect, αt is the year fixed effect, and eit is an i.i.d. 
error term. The control variables in Xit are household size, average age of household 
members and its square, dependent ratios (the ratios of children less than 16 years old 
and elders over 60 years old in total number of household members), per-capita 
landholding (in mu, which is equal to one fifteenth hectare), and years in school of the 
household head. The square of the average household age is included to capture the 
life-cycle effect in a household’s income capability. In rural China, land is allocated 
by the village and the distribution is adjusted periodically to roughly equalize the 
per-capita landholding in each household (Liu, Carter, and Yao, 1998). So per-capita 
landholding can be regarded as independent of the income. The educational   24
attainment of the household head is not likely to be affected by the current income 
because the head obtained his/her education before the family was formed. However, 
it is possible that the household’s demographic characteristics are correlated with 
income. For example, low-income households may have more children due to the 
substitution between quality and quantity (Becker, Murphy, and Tamura, 1990). 
Allowing household fixed effect may mitigate this type of endogeneity since the 
fixed-effect model permits arbitrary correlation between the fixed effect term αi and 
the regressors, including all demographic variables. Nevertheless, we will estimate 
equation (15) without the demographic variables to see how our results would differ. 
After deleting observations with missing data, we are left with 1,185 households 
with a total of 13,515 observations for the period of 1987-2002 (with data of 1990, 
1992, and 1994 missing). Basic statistics of the control variables as well as those of 
the dependent variables are provided in Table 1. 
[Table 1 about here] 
The two-way fixed-effect model in (15) provides an almost ideal control on the 
endogeneity of health shocks that arises from missing variables that are not time 
variant. However, it may not control the endogeneity arising from the kind of reverse 
causality that we described in the last section. To take care of this problem, we follow 
the literature to use two community variables to instrument health shocks. They are 
the number of hospitals in the township or xiang that the village resides and the 
number of hospitals in the whole county. More hospitals increase competition and 
make it more convenient for families to send their sick members to hospitals. Both   25
work to reduce the costs of hospitalization, so households residing in a region with 
more hospitals will be more likely to treat their sick members. On the other hand, 
more hospitals do not have an impact on household income except through the 
channel of health. Therefore, the two instruments are reasonable ones for our purpose.   
Another way to check our results is to estimate equation (15) only with the 
observations of the early years. Figure 5 shows that up to 1996, the incidence of 
health shocks was about 3-4% each year. So as a robustness check we will estimate 
the model again by using the observations of 1987-1996.
9 
 
3.2 Average effects of health shocks 
[Table 2 about here] 
Table 2 presents the results of the above estimations. Column (1) presents the 
results of the baseline model in (15). It shows that a health shock reduces household 
per-capita income by an average of 11.9% in each year after the shock at the 1% 
significance level. Given that a household has already spent at least 5,000 RMB for 
the shock, the negative welfare impact of a major health shock on households is 
striking.  
All the control variables except the schooling years of the household head have 
significant coefficients. As expected, household size and dependent ratio reduce 
per-capita income, and more land increases per-capita income. In addition, there is an 
                                                        
9  There could be a problem of memory loss. However, there is no a prior reason to believe that richer households 
are less likely than poor households to remember major health shocks.   26
inverse U relationship between average household age and per-capita income, which 
is consistent with the life-cycle behavior of the family. 
Column (2) in Table 2 presents the results when the demographic variables are 
dropped. The negative effect of a health shock is only slightly higher than in Column 
(1). So the endogeneity of the demographic variables is not likely to bias the 
coefficient of the health shock, the main concern of this paper. 
Column (3) repeats Column (1) using data of period 1987-1996. The results are 
qualitatively the same as those of Column (1) except that the inverse U relationship 
between household age and income vanishes. In particular, the negative impact of a 
health shock is to reduce per-capita income by 13.5%, which is larger than but still 
close to the impact found in Column (1). To the extent that report biases were less 
likely to happen in the early years, this result is consistent with our conjecture that our 
estimation in Column (1) using the whole sample would provide the estimate of the 
lower bound of the impact of health shocks. 
The conclusion that a major health shock has a very large effect on long term 
income is also supported by the results of the two-stage estimation reported in 
Column (4) of Table 2.
10  These results are qualitatively the same as those of Column 
(1). In particular, the coefficient of the health shock dummy remains significantly 
negative. Its magnitude, however, has become substantially larger and almost doubles 
the estimate provided by Column (1). In addition, its significance has dropped to the 
                                                        
10  The first stage estimation uses the linear probability model for the shock dummy and estimates the village fixed 
effects instead of the household fixed effects because the three instruments are all measures at the community 
level.   27
10% significance level. This raises the question as to whether our instruments are 
adequate. To answer this question, we check the first-stage regression results. First, 
both instruments have highly significantly positive coefficients, agreeing with our 
earlier conjectures. Second, the F-statistic is 51.3 when only the two instruments are 
included in the first-stage regression. So the problem of weak instruments is unlikely 
to exist. Third, we compare the R
2 of the first-stage regression with the control 
variables in (15) and that without, and find that they are virtually the same: the former 
is 0.191 and the latter is 0.189. So the two instruments provide most of the 
explanatory power for the incidence of major health shocks. The likely suspect for the 
large estimate in Column (4) is the group effects associated with the two instruments 
as both are community-level variables. In effect, the estimate for the shock dummy 
provided by Column (4) reflects the average effect between villages with more 
households hit by health shocks and those with less. This is of course not an ideal 
measure, but is the best that we can get with available data. No matter how crude it 
may be, the confirmation of a health shock’s negative impact by the two-stage 
estimation still provides us confidence in our baseline estimation.   
 
3.3 Dynamic effects of health shocks 
Our data allows us to test Hypothesis 1 by studying the dynamic impacts of health 
shocks over a long period of 15 years after a shock happens. To that end, we estimate 
a variant of equation (15) by replacing the health shock dummy by 16 dummies 
indicating, respectively, the year when a shock happened, one year after the shock, …,   28
and fifteen years after the shock. Instead of presenting the whole set of results, we 
present the estimates for the dummies in Figure 6. The proof of Hypothesis 1 is 
evident because the negative impacts of a health shock clearly exhibit a U-shaped 
curve as time goes by. The estimates for the last three years are highly insignificant 
because of the small numbers of observations for those years. All the other years have 
significant estimates. At the trough of the U curve, which occurs in the eighth year 
after a sock, a health shock reduces per-capita income by 28.4%. Using the average 
speed of recovery between the eighth and the fifteenth year, a shock-hit household is 
projected to be able to fully recover from the poverty trap after 10 more years. In total, 
a household with a major health shock would have to suffer a lower income for 19 
years before fully recovery. This is a long time period by any means.   
  [Figure 6 about here] 
 
4.  The Role of Village Elections 
China began to experiment village elections in 1987 (O’brien and Li, 2000). The 
48 villages in our sample began the first election in various years. Figure 7 shows the 
number and accumulative percentage of villages that began elections in each year. 
Twelve of the sample villages were among the first in the nation to introduce elections 
in 1987. By 1990, more than half of the sample villages had at least one election. Two 
other features not shown in Figure 7 are relevant for our econometric estimations. One 
is that there is a clear regional pattern in the introduction of the first election. Villages 
in the same province tended to introduce the first election around the time when the   29
province enacted an implementation version of the OLVC. The other is that the 
introduction of the first election was not related to the level of income. For example, 
villages in both Zhejiang (an affluent province) and Sichuan (a poorer province) 
began to have elections in 1987 whereas villages in Guangdong province (an affluent 
province) only began elections in 1998. These two features show that the introduction 
of the first election was independent of income but more dependent on the decision of 
the province. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the introduction of elections is 
totally exogenous to the village. The division of interests within the village may affect 
the timing of the introduction.   
[Figure 7 about here] 
As long as election is introduced, a village is required to hold elections every 
three years. Our primary concern is the introduction of the first election as it marks 
the start of grassroots democracy in a village. We thus create the election dummy that 
assigns value 1 for a village after it has introduced election and value 0 for a village 
before it introduced election or a village that has never introduced election.   
 
4.1 Elections and healthcare plans 
To test Hypothesis 2, we study whether a village had any healthcare plan. There 
are several kinds of healthcare plans in rural China. The most fundamental one is the 
village-based rural cooperative healthcare system. It was almost universal during the 
commune period, but was dismantled in most villages since the rural reform took 
place as its finance depended on the commune system. In some advanced regions, the   30
village-based system has been replaced by the township-based system that provides 
limited reimbursements to clinic visits. In recent years, the central government has 
begun to promote a new sort of cooperative healthcare plan that is based on voluntary 
participation and pools at the county level. On top of those plans, some villages have 
also joined limited commercial healthcare plans. In our study, we code a village as 
having a healthcare plan as long as it had any of the above plans regardless of the 
benefits that they provided. We have data for 48 villages for the period of 1986 to 
2002. Among those 48 villages, twenty-eight did not have any healthcare plan while 
four had a healthcare plan over the entire period. The rest of villages had a healthcare 
plan in part of years in the sample period. Among those villages, three had a plan 
before they started village elections and continued till 2002, while four started 
healthcare plans before elections but stopped (two of them) or had a period of 
interruption (two of them). The rest of the nine villages began to have a plan after or 
in the year when they held the first election. These raw data show that there was a 
large chance that healthcare plans were established after the first election was held. 
We then estimate the following model with village and year fixed effects: 
(16)  jt t j jt E jt jt e E Z I + + + + = α α α β , 
where Ijt is a dummy variable indicating whether the jth village had a healthcare plan 
in year t, Zjt is a set of control variables at the village level, Ejt is a dummy variable 
indicating whether the jth village had had at least one election in year t, αj is the 
village specific effect for the jth village, αt is the year fixed effect for year t, and ejt is 
an i.i.d. error term. We have included in Zjt three variables, village average per-capita   31
income (in 2002 RMB), the logarithm of village population, and the Gini coefficient 
of per-capita household income. The Gini coefficient is calculated using the original 
NFS household sample instead of the sample surveyed under this study. We do this 
because the original NFS sample covers 50-100 households in each village but 2003 
supplemental survey had a much smaller sample because of our construction of the 
panel structure. It is natural to expect that villages with higher levels of income would 
be more likely to have a healthcare plan. A larger population increases the difficulty 
for collective decision, and higher Gini coefficient implies a more divided population, 
so both could reduce the chances for a village to set up a healthcare plan. Descriptive 
statistics of the control variables and the healthcare and election dummies can be 
found in Table 1. 
The village fixed effects in equation (16) can effectively deal with the 
simultaneity between elections and healthcare plans arising from time-invariant 
village characteristics. In the meantime, the year fixed effects provide control on 
temporal shocks that are common to all the villages, including national policy changes 
regarding the election. However, there may still be simultaneities that the two sets of 
fixed effects cannot capture. To check our results, we will also estimate a two-stage 
version of equation (16) by instrumenting the election dummy with three variables: a 
dummy variable indicating when a province adopted the OLVC (i.e., it is equal to 1 if 
a province had adopted the law and equal to 0 otherwise), the number of surnames in 
the village, and the percentage of population of the largest surname. The last two 
variables do not have variations over time. To fit into the panel estimation, they are   32
interacted with the first variable. The reason for using the timing of a province’s 
adoption of the OLVC is evident against our earlier description on the introduction of 
the first election. The number of surnames is an indication for the degree of fraction in 
a village. A more fractioned village could be either less or more likely to start 
elections. On the one hand, politics in a more fractioned village is more contesting so 
elections are in a larger demand; on the other hand, though, it can be harder for a more 
fractioned village even to organize the first election.   
The model in (16) is first estimated by the probit and the linear probability model 
(LMP) with village and year fixed effects.
11 Except one village that began to have 
data since 1996, all the other 47 villages have 17 years of observations. This enables 
us to avoid the problem of a short panel that the probit estimates are inconsistent when 
fixed effects are estimated. The total number of observations is 806. 
[Table 3 about here] 
The results of the two estimations are presented in the first two columns of Table 
3. Marginal effects are reported for the probit model. The two-stage estimation is 
based on the linear probability model (LPM) and its results are presented in column 3 
of the table. The first-stage regression yields an R
2 of 0.67 and an F-statistic of 25.9 
when only the three instruments are included, which are virtually the same as those 
when the second-stage variables are added. In addition, the introduction of elections 
to a village is strongly linked with a province’s adoption of the election law (which 
                                                        
11  The probit panel model is estimated using the routine provided by LIMDEP. This routine can only handle 
one-way fixed effects. The year fixed effects are thus estimated by manually adding year dummies in the 
regression.   33
increases a village’s chances to start elections by 32%), but negatively related to the 
number of surnames in a village (although the effect is only 0.3% for one more 
surname). Therefore, our instruments are reasonable.   
None of the three control variables except village average income in the two LPM 
models is significant. The probit model shows that elections significantly increase the 
chances of a village to set up a healthcare plan by 11.9%. There is a possibility that 
this large effect is spurious, though. There are seven villages that began to have 
healthcare plans before they held any election, so the positive effect of election may 
only reflect the persistence of the healthcare plans. While this may be indeed a valid 
argument, there is also a probability that a village would have stopped its healthcare 
plans had there not been an election. Indeed, among the seven villages that began 
healthcare plans before their elections, two stopped healthcare plans before 2002, and 
two had several years of interruption. On the other hand, none of the nine villages that 
began their healthcare plans in or after the year of the first election had an interruption. 
However, the LPM does provide a much smaller estimate of 5.6% that has a reduced 
statistical significance, and the two-stage estimation turns the estimate insignificant. 
This shows that the positive effect of elections comes from the simultaneous 
determination between the first election and the establishment of a healthcare plan in a 
village. 
 
4.2 Elections and individual borrowings 
To test Hypothesis 3, we study the propensity of shock-hit families to borrow.   34
There were 500 households that had at least one family member having a major 
illness in the period of 1987-2002. While the majority (73.6%) had only one incidence 
of a major shock, 19.8% of them had two, 4.6% three, and 2% four or more. The total 
number of shocks was 676. Among them, 35.8% had borrowed from informal sources 
(relatives, friends, or other people in the village). Informal sources are our major 
concern as our theoretical model predicts that election reduces individual borrowings 
from those sources.
12 We will study the borrowing decision of the 676 cases of 
shocks. For that purpose, we define a binary choice variable describing whether a 
shock-hit family borrowed from an informal source to pay for the treatment of its sick 
member, and estimate a model defined by 
(17)  jik t j E j ji jik jik e E X X X B + + + + + = α α β β β 3 2 1 . 
In the equation, Bjik is the borrowing decision (1 = to borrow, 0 = not to borrow) of 
household i in the jth village for its kth shock. Xjik is a set of variables describing the 
sick person’s characteristics in the year when he/she was sick. It includes his/her age, 
gender (male = 1, female = 0), and schooling years. Those variables are meant to 
control family preferences toward individual members. Xji is a set of household-level 
variables describing the household’s characteristics in the year when the specific 
shock happened. It includes all the control variables used in equation (15) plus the 
per-capita value of the stock of physical assets in the year before the shock. This last 
variable is added to reflect Result 1 in the theoretical model. Xj is a set of village-level 
                                                        
12  There were only a small number of illnesses, 2.1% of the 676 cases, for which families borrowed from official 
sources (mainly the rural credit cooperatives). So we ignore them in our analysis.   35
variables for community characteristics in the year when the specific shock happened. 
It includes the three control variables that we used in equation (16) and the number of 
hospitals in the township and in the county, respectively. The first three variables are 
included to control things that are correlated with elections, and the last two are 
included to control the availability of healthcare. As we argued when we estimated 
equation (15), more hospitals in the nearby region lower the relative costs of 
treatments and induce a household to spend more on treatments. As a result, 
households living in a region with more hospitals would borrow more. Ej is a dummy 
variable indicating whether the jth village had held at least one election by the year 
when the specific shock happened. Finally, αt is the year specific effect for the year 
when the specific shock happened, and ejik is an i.i.d. error term.   
[Table 4 about here] 
The model in (17) is first estimated by the probit model. The results are presented 
in the first column of Table 4. Elections are shown not to significantly reduce the 
probability of a household to borrow. To further explore the issue, we take the 
sub-sample of shocks that only involved working adults, i.e., adults between 16 and 
60 years old. A health shock on a working adult has a more significant impact on a 
family’s income capability than a shock on a child or an old person, so elections could 
have a larger effect than before. We run both the probit and the LPM on this 
sub-sample (491 observations). Their results are presented in columns 2 and 3 of 
Table 4. The effect of elections has indeed increased reaching 16.7% and 14.9% in the 
probit and the LPM, respectively. The last column presents results of the two-stage   36
estimation based on the sub-sample. The estimate for the effect of elections is 
comparable with the two previous estimates. 
The estimates for several control variables are worth discussions. An older family 
(i.e., a family with a larger average age) tends less likely to borrow although the effect 
is very small. Consistent with our expectation, a larger stock of assets reduces a 
family’s probability to borrow, but again, the effect is very small. The puzzling result 
is that per-capita land increases the probability to borrow. Perhaps the amount of land 
reflects more that the household resides in an agricultural region and thus is poor than 
that it has more assets. Among the village variables, the effect of per-capita income is 
significant but the magnitude is rather small. The interesting result is that the number 
of hospitals in the county significantly increases the probability to borrow, confirming 
our conjecture that more hospitals reduce the costs of treatment.   
 
4.3 Elections and long-term income   
To test Hypothesis 4, we add to the income equation (15) the election dummy 
defined in equation (16) and its interaction term with the shock dummy and estimate 
the modified model again. The first column of Table 5 presents the results for the 
shock and election dummies as well as their interaction term (the results of the control 
variables are not shown). The coefficients of all the three variables are highly 
significant and have the expected signs. By the results, a household living in a village 
without any election would lose 20.7% of its income due to a health shock; elections 
reduce this negative effect by 11.8 percentage points (or 56.5% of it), so a household   37
living in a village with at least one election only loses 8.9% of its income. The 
election itself increases per-capita income by 29.7%. However, this large effect may 
pick up some of the trend of income growth although we have controlled the year 
fixed effects. 
[Table 5 about here] 
The second column of Table 5 presents the results of the two-stage panel 
estimation that treats health shocks as endogenous using the same instruments used in 
R4 of Table 2. The negative effect of a health shock in a village without any election 
is substantially larger than what we have obtained in the plain panel estimation, but 
the effect of an election to mitigate it also becomes much larger. In relative terms, 
though, the election’s effect does not change dramatically: now it is 51.8% of the 
negative effect of the health shock, which is close to the figure of 56.5% that we 
obtained in the plain panel estimation. As we discussed before, the estimated effect of 
a health shock when the shock is treated as endogenous is the shock’s average effect 
across villages because both instruments are community-level variables. So a certain 
degree of noises exists in the estimates.   
The third column of Table 5 reports the results treating the election dummy as 
endogenous but leaving health shocks exogenous. They are comparable with those of 
the plain panel estimation. In particular, the relative contribution of elections is now 
52.8% of the total impact of health shocks. In addition, the direct contribution of 
elections to income growth now has been reduced to a more modest figure of 17.4%. 
   38
5.  Conclusions 
 
Using a longitudinal sample of households in 48 Chinese villages for the period of 
1986-2002, this paper finds that a major health shock has strong and persistent 
negative impacts on household per-capita income. In the first 16 years starting with 
the year of the shock, a shock-hit household drops below its normal income trajectory 
by an average of 11.8%. Using the estimates we obtained in our regressions, we 
predict that the negative impact of a major health shock would persist for a total of 19 
years. To our knowledge, our study provides the first systematic assessment on health 
shocks’ persistent impacts on rural households’ income capabilities in developing 
economies.  
Consistent with our theoretical predictions, we also find strong evidence that 
grassroots democracy helps alleviate the negative impacts of health shocks. Villages 
are found to be more likely to set up a healthcare plan after it has started elections. 
Families are less likely to borrow from informal sources to treat their sick working 
members if their village has begun elections. The contribution of elections is to reduce 
the chances to borrow by 16.7%. As a result, village elections reduce the negative 
impact of a health shock on per-capita income by an average of 56.6%. We attribute 
these findings to village elections’ role in holding the village government accountable 
to the villagers. A health shock received by a poor household has a negative 
externality on the richer portion of the population, so a pro-poor policy can win 
supports from both the poor and the rich.     39
Our findings make a tangible contribution to the literature of social capital and 
grassroots governance. Social capital has been emphasized in recent development 
literature as a device for rural people to effectively deal with income and other shocks. 
While our findings do not refuse this line of reasoning, we nevertheless show that 
public intervention can be an effective substitute for private social networks. Because 
relying on private social networks implies negative externalities on the whole 
population, public intervention has an advantage.   
Although our theoretical model predicts that a healthcare plan can emerge even 
when it is fully self-financed, we would like to emphasize that a publicly subsidized 
plan is also possible to emerge in villages with elections. This is so because funds can 
be made available by better local governance instead of by raising taxes. Using the 
same dataset that this paper uses, Wang and Yao (2006) find that village elections 
have raised the share of public investment and reduced the share of administrative 
costs in village expenditures. They also find that elections have not increased the level 
of taxation in the village. Zhang et al. (2004) find similar results using data from 
Jiangsu province. Our econometric analysis did not distinguish between self-financed 
and publicly subsidized healthcare plans. Weighing against the above two studies, we 
are confident that the positive role of village elections in mitigating health shocks is 
not necessarily brought about by an expanding village government, but rather by 
better village governance. 
Our findings also have strong implications to the debate on the Chinese experiment 
of village elections. While the initial intention of the experiment was to curb local   40
corruption by empowering local people (O’Brien and Li, 2000), many have placed 
doubts on its effectiveness in achieving the goal. Our results provide strong evidence 
to support the positive role that the village election has played in the last 20 some 
years. Although there are still ample room for improvements and even mistakes to 
correct, village elections have shown its role to increase local accountability and for 
that matter, to contribute to poverty alleviation.   41
Appendix I: Derivation of the BGP for a shock-free farmer 
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These two equations uniquely determine the values of M and  θThey are 
independent of the initial stocks of assets and health.   
If  δ σ = đthat is, assets and health have the same depreciation rates, we can get 
an explicit solution to M and θ. From (A4) and (A5), we get 
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y 1 1 , so income grows at a constant rate of θ 
– 1, which is also the growth rate for assets and health.  42
Appendix II: Proof of result 1 
 
Using the two constraints in (11) one can express KE and B as a function of  τ K
~
 so 
the problem in (11) is reduced to a problem with one unknown  τ K
~
, and the 
first-order condition is 
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τ τ ρ  is  positive,  so  τ τ K K ∂ ∂ /
~
 cannot  be 
signed. But expressing B and τ K
~
as a function of KE and solve the problem in (11) 
again, it is easy to find that the sign of  τ K KE ∂ ∂ /   also depends on 
τ τ τ K B V B V
~
/ /
2 2 2 ∂ ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂  so  τ τ K K ∂ ∂ /
~
 and  τ K KE ∂ ∂ /   have the same sign. Since 
the sum of τ K
~
and KE is Kτ, it is impossible that both decrease in Kτ, so they both have 
to increase in Kτ. As a result, a farmer with a larger stock of assets tends to borrow 
less.   43
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Table 1. Basic statistics of variables 
Variables  Mean St.  dev. Min.  Max. 
 
Personal variables (based on 676 persons having received a health shock)
Age  44.00 18.68 0.00   91.00
Gender  0.44 0.50 0.00   1.00
Schooling years  4.56 3.38 0.00   14.00
 
Household variables (1,185 households for 1987-2002, 13,515 cases)
Health shock dummy 0.22 0.42 0.00   1.00
Household size 4.53 1.82 1.00   21.00
Average age of household members 32.22 9.63 8.20   82.50
Dependent ratio 0.40 0.22 0.00   1.00
Per-capita land (in mu) 1.37 2.02 0.00   69.75





Per-capita assets (1,000 RMB)  7.24 24.37 0.00   771.64
Number of hospitals in township
*  1.09 0.36 0.00    4.00 
Number of hospitals in county
*  2.82 1.62 1.00    8.00 
 
Village variables (48 villages for 1986-2002, 806 cases) 
Election dummy  0.66 0.47 0.00    1.00 
Healthcare plan dummy  0.27 0.44 0.00   1.00





Population  1458.27 1061.99 235.00   5247.00
Gini coefficient  0.28 0.09 0.06   0.67
Notes: All financial figures are converted into 2002 RMB using the consumer price index 
published in NBS (2003). 
* The statistics of these two variables are calculated based on the household dataset.   46
Table 2. Average effects of health shocks on income
 





































































































2   0.422 0.403  0.501    0.421 
Number of obs.   13,515 13,515  7,290    13,515 
Notes: All four models are estimated by the two-way fixed-effect panel method. Column (1) uses 
the whole sample of 1,185 households of 48 villages in the period 1987-2002 and includes the 
control variables; Column (2) drops the demographic variables; Column (3) uses data for the 
period 1987-1996; and  Column (4) instruments health shocks by the number of hospitals in the 
township/xiang and the number of hospitals in the county. Heteroscedasticity-corrected standard 
errors are reported in the parentheses. 
* Significant at the 10% significance level; ** Significant at the 5% significance level; *** 
Significant at the 1% significance level. 
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2   -104.62 0.712  0.711 
Notes:  
1.  The number of villages is 48, and time span is 1986-2002. The number of observations is 806. 
All three regressions are estimated with village and year fixed effects. * Significant at the 10% 
significance level; ** Significant at the 5% significance level; *** Significant at the 1% 
significance level. 
2.  Marginal effects estimated at the means of the explanatory variables are reported. Robust 
standard errors of the marginal effects are reported in the parentheses. LIMDEP does not 
provide the constant term for its probit panel estimation. 
3.  Heteroscedasticity-corrected standard errors are reported in the parentheses. 
4.  The 2SLS panel estimation is based on the LPM model and uses the timing of provincial 
adoption of the election law and its interaction terms with the number of surnames and the 
percentage of the largest surname as the instruments for the election dummy. 
Heteroscedasticity-corrected standard errors are reported in the parentheses. 
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Table 4. Impacts of elections on individual borrowings
1 
Variables   Probit I
2  Probit II
2  LPM































































































































Village variables          




























































2   0.108 0.123 0.067    0.066 
Number of cases   676 491 491    491 
Notes:  
1.  All regressions are estimated with year fixed effects. * Significant at the 10% significance 
level; ** Significant at the 5% significance level; *** Significant at the 1% significance level. 
2.  Both regressions are probit estimation on the decision whether to borrow from informal 
sources. Probit I uses the whole sample of shocks; probit II uses the sub-sample of shocks on   49
family labors between 16 and 60 years old. Marginal effects estimated at the means of the 
explanatory variables. Robust standard errors of the marginal effects are reported in the 
parentheses. 
3.  The linear probit model is estimated with the sample of probit II. Heteroscedasticity-corrected 
standard errors are reported in the parentheses. 
4.  The 2SLS panel estimation is conducted with the LPM model using the sample of probit II. It 
uses the timing of provincial adoption of the election law and its interaction terms with the 
number of surnames and the percentage of the largest surname as the instruments for the 





Table 5. Selected results for the effect of village elections on household income 











































2   0.431 0.430  0.423 
Notes: The sample contains 1,185 households in 48 villages for the period 1987-2002, and the 
number of observations is 13,515. All three regressions are estimated with household and year 
fixed effects. Plain panel estimation treats both health shocks and elections as exogenous, and the 
other two regressions treat health shocks and elections as endogenous, respectively. The 
instruments are the same as those used before. Heteroscedasticity-corrected standard errors are 
presented in the parentheses. Results for the control variables are not shown. 
* Significant at the 10% significance level; ** Significant at the 5% significance level; *** 
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Figure 1. Simulated dynamics of a health shock 
 



















































Notes: The parameters used in the simulation are:  A= 0.3;  δ = 0.05;  σ = 0.05;  h = 0.5;  ρ = 
0.95;  α =0.3; r = 0.05; T = 5. Initial asset and health stocks are obtained from the BGP and take 
the values of 0.60 and 0.85, respectively.   51












































Notes: Income has been converted to 2002 RMB using the consumer price index published in 
NBS (2003). 
 
Km  K K  K
CB(K) 
CL(K) 
Premium   52



































Average for shock-free hhs Average for shock-hit hhs before shock
 
Notes: Income has been converted to 2002 RMB using the consumer price index published in 
NBS (2003). The two series represent, respectively, annual average income for households that 
were not hit by a major health shock in the entire period 1987-2002 and annual average income in 
the years before a major health shock came for households that were hit by a major health shock. 
A shock-hit household is defined as one that had at least one of its member being hit by a major 
health shock in the period 1987-2002. 
 
 


















































































Incidence of health shocks Cumulative incidence of health shocks
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(0.01) (0.01)(0.01)(0.10)(0.08)(0.00)(0.07)(0.00)(0.00) (0.01)(0.00)(0.02)(0.01) (0.21)(0.36)(0.48)
polynomial trend
Notes: The curve is drawn based on the dynamic effects obtained from the estimation of equation 
(15) by replacing the health shock dummy with 16 dummies indicating the years after a shock. 
Figures in parentheses are significance levels of the estimates.   54
  Figure 7. Introduction of elections in sample villages 
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